Kyoto University · Economic Research Institute · 教授

Research keywords契約の理論・Contract Theory・Game Theory・Microeconomics・り返しゲームの理論・長期的関係・の世界・の理論を学ぶ繰り返しゲームの世界

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• The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners’ DilemmaGames and Economic Behavior,
• The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costsJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,
• Multimarket contact under demand fluctuationsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY,
• A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoringECONOMICS LETTERS,

• The Analysis of Repeated Games with Observation Costs
• Information Structure and Efficiency in Long-Run Relationships
• A theoretical study on the dynamic provision of incentives in organizations
• 長期的関係における情報構造と効率性の関係

• Official profile