Osaka University of Economics · Faculty of Economics · 准教授

Research keywordsNash implementation・double implementation・procedural fairness・bargaining games・strategy-proofness・social choice theory・dominant strategy equilibrium・single-peaked preferences

This is a public-data preview. Personalized fit, contact angles, and saved workflows require sign-in.

• The focal Luce model with status quo
• On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: A full characterization
• A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution
• King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies

• 実験経済学の結果に基づく遂行理論の構築
• 繰り返す環境の下で非合理的な個人が存在するときの遂行問題
• 限定合理的な人々の意思決定に基づく制度設計

• Official profile